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ARGUMENT 
This Court should reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment for the 
Appellees/Graffs and remand the matter to the trial court. Appellants/Developers 
properly preserved all of the issues appealed because the trial court had an opportunity to 
consider the merits of each issue appealed and to correct any error. Furthermore, 
Developers sufficiently pleaded facts to satisfy the partial performance exception to the 
statute of frauds. Also, the statute of frauds does not bar recovery under Developers' 
equitable claims. Finally, Developers have a good faith basis in both law and fact for this 
appeal and complied with the requirements of Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
L THE TRIAL COURT HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO CONSIDER THE 
MERITS OF EACH ISSUE APPEALED. 
According to the Utah Supreme Court, "in order to preserve an issue for appeal[,] 
the issue must be presented to the trial court in such a way that the trial court has an 
opportunity to rule on that issue/* Brookside Mobile Home Park Ltd. v. Peebles, 2002 
UT 48, % 14, 48 P.3d 968. Presentation at the trial court level must put 'the trial judge on 
notice of the asserted error and allow[] for correction at that time in the course of the 
proceeding." 438 Main Street v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, \ 51, 99 P.3d 801. An 
appellate court will deem that the trial court had an opportunity to correct the error if the 
issue was raised in a timely fashion, the issue was specifically raised, and the challenging 
party introduced supporting evidence or relevant legal authority. Id. (quoting Brookside, 
2002 UT 48, *j 14). 
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In this case. Developers properly raised with the trial court all of the issues that are 
currently before this court. Developers raised their arguments against the application of 
the statute of frauds in the memorandum opposing summary judgment (R. at 1002-1012) 
and their arguments regarding the vitality of their equitable claims in their opposition to 
the motion for partial summary judgment (R. at 313-373) and in their opposition to the 
proposed order granting summary judgment (R. 1089-1097). In ail of these instances, the 
issues now before this Court were fully briefed and the trial court had ample opportunity 
to consider both sides' arguments and make a decision. Therefore, all of the issues that 
Developers raised in this appeal were properly preserved at the trial court level and are 
correctly before this Court. 
IL DEVELOPERS PLEADED SUFFICIENT FACTS TO SATISFY THE 
PARTIAL PERFORMANCE EXCEPTION TO THE STATUTE OF 
FRAUDS, 
Developers and Graffs both concede that the "standard for sufficient partial 
performance5* is the four-prong test that the Utah Supreme Court promulgated in Spears 
v. Warr, 2002 UT 24, ^ 24, 44 P.3d 742. This test is not new; the exact language in 
Spears was actually established over fifty years ago by the Utah Supreme Court in 
Randall v. Tracy Collins Trust Co., 305 P.2d 480, 484 (1956). Also, the "doctrine of past 
performance, in the state of Utah, has not been reduced to a formula, as it has in some 
other states.v Ryan v. Earl, 618 P.2d 54, 56 (Utah 1980) (quoting Holmgren Brothers, 
Inc. v. Ballard, 534 P.2d 61L 613-14 (Utah 1975)). In Utah, "decisions of this court do 
not stay the hand of equity in the equitable situations created by oral contracts for the 
transfer of an interest in land.'" Id. As for the statute of frauds, it "is preserved and 
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remains to serve its purpose—the prevention of fraud and injustice." Id. Therefore, in 
Utah, this partial performance exception exists to ensure that equity and justice are done, 
and the situations of each unique case should be considered by the trial court with equity, 
first and foremost, in mind. 
The case Fisher v Fisher is instructive on how the Utah Court of Appeals 
analyzed the partial performance exception within the context of the exception's 
fundamental goal to ensure that equity and justice prevail. 907 P.2d 1172 (Utah App. 
1995). In Fishei\ the Utah Court of Appeals applied the partial performance exception to 
oral modifications of an escrow agreement that called for annual payments of $10,000. 
Id. at 1175. In that case, the grantor of the land continually told the grantee that, for tax 
purposes, he did not want to accept the escrow payment. Id. The grantor did not establish 
a new definite timeframe for repayment, but rather indicated that the grantees did not 
have to pay him according to the strict terms of the contract. Id. Based upon those 
assurances, the grantees invested a great deal of money and resources in the land. Id. 
Several years later, however, the trust that possessed the note against the grantee 
attempted to terminate the prior escrow agreement based upon nonpayment. Id. The court 
found that the partial performance doctrine applied in that case, even though the only 
actual oral change to the written contract was an indefinite indication that payments could 
be made at some future date. Id. at 1777. Additionally, the court held that a narrow 
meeting of the minds—to delay repayment—was sufficiently clear and definite to 
constitute an agreement upon which partial performance would overcome the statute of 
frauds and validate the oral modification. Id. 
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Like Fisher, Developers relied upon Max Graffs implied modification: that the 
closing deadline would be waived to accommodate eventual lull performance of the 
contract. Although every detail of that modification was not definite, the modification 
itself was. When David Robinson requested the extension from Max Graff Graff 
indicated that he agreed to the modification and that Robinson simply needed to contact 
Don Gilbert, Graffs attorney (who was also the closing agent for the parties), to 
memorialize the modification. (R. at 322.) After Robinson and others made several 
unsuccessful attempts to reach Gilbert, Robinson again contacted Graff, who again 
indicated that Gilbert was the one to memorialize the modification. (R. at 322-23.) There 
were no missing essential terms to this oral agreement, because the modification was, like 
in Fisher, the essential term. 
Further, Developers' affirmative decision to forego hard money lenders and allow 
the closing deadline to expire was sufficiently definite to satisfy the partial performance 
exception. Most importantly, however, the inequitable result of Developers" reasonable 
reliance upon Graffs modification compels the application of the partial performance 
exception to the statute of frauds. Like the grantees in Fisher, Developers have invested 
hundreds of thousands of dollars into the property, and a rigid application of the statute of 
frauds would allow Graffs to unjustly benefit from Developers exhaustive efforts. 
Further. Max Graffs modification was not an unenforceable agreement to agree 
on another extension, but, was. as all of Graff s other extension communications, a 
modification to allow the parties to fulfill the contract. Graffs' point to David Early 
Group, Inc. v. BFSRetail & Commercial Operations, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5694 (D. 
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Utah 2008), as authority supporting their assertion that Max Graffs modification was 
solely an agreement to agree. But, in David Early, the agreement was between the 
parties' two negotiators that the parties themselves would, at an undetermined future date, 
confer and agree regarding which party would pay for selected repair expenses even 
though the contract between the parties specifically identified who was responsible for 
the repair costs. 
In contrast, in this case, the two parties themselves spoke face to face, reached an 
apparent understanding, and knew and understood the immediate and direct 
consequences of Graffs modification and instruction for Mr. Robinson to contact Mr. 
Gilbert to memorialize the details of the extension. For these reasons, as well as the 
reasons in Developers' original brief, this Court should reverse the trial court's refusal to 
apply the partial performance exception to the statute of frauds. At a minimum, there is a 
question of material fact whether Mr. Graff implicitly or explicitly agreed to an 
extension; if such a question exists, summary judgment is not appropriate. 
IEL THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS DOES NOT BAR RECOVERY UNDER 
DEVELOPERS9 EQUITABLE CLAIMS. 
Developers' claims for unjust enrichment and detrimental reliance both survive the 
trial court's finding that the statute of frauds applied to the oral modification of the 
closing deadline. These are equitable claims that exist for the very reason that Developers 
asserted them in the first place—to compensate Developers for their efforts made wholly 
in reasonable reliance upon the promises made by Graffs. See Am. Towers Owners' Ass 'n 
v. CCIMech, 930 P.2d 1182, 1193 (Utah 1996) (stating that the unjust enrichment 
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doctrine uis designed to provide an equitable remedy where one does not exist at law'"); 
Andreason v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 848 P.2d 171, 174 (Utah App. 1993) 
(considering promissory estoppel/detrimental reliance and stating that "equity recognizes 
the unfairness of permitting withdrawal of [a] promise and will enforce it"). 
Developers' unjust enrichment claim is based upon the fact that Graffs unjustly 
retained tangible financial benefits without any payment for their value. The Graffs 
received much more than simply an increase in the value of their land. The Graffs 
personally benefited because they did not have to pay for or individually seek out any of 
the time or efforts spent by Developers in their myriad interactions with appraisers, city 
officials, engineers, surveyors, and others that were vital to the preparation of the land for 
the planned community. (R. at 40; 226; 378-79; 382.) Furthermore, the Graffs did not 
have to spend any of the hundreds of thousands of dollars required in acquisition costs, 
interests, fees, and other expenses. Id. The Graffs knew of these benefits, (R. at 40; 226; 
376-77), and Max Graff indicated to Dave Robinson that he prayed for the contract to fail 
(which, for purposes of the standard of review in this appeal justifies the reasonable and 
favorable inference that Max Graff hoped to sell the propert} for a higher price per acre 
to a newr suitor who did not have to undertake all of the efforts and costs that Developers 
had undertaken). (R. at 381.) Allowing the Graffs to retain these benefits without 
payment of their value would be inequitable. 
The Graffs attempt to frame the benefit that they received solely as "the increased 
property value." (Graffs" Br. at 25.) Further, the Graffs attempt to compare this case to 
McKay Dee Credit Union v. Federal Home Loan Mortg. Corp., in which the Utah Court 
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of Appeals did not allow the credit union to recover for the "profit FHLM realized on the 
later sale of the property/' 2008 WL 1970944, *1. The two cases are not comparable. In 
McKay, the credit union failed to appear at a foreclosure sale, which enabled the high 
bidder for the property (FHLM) to acquire the property and resell the property for a 
profit. The credit union attempted to claim that their failure to appear, and FHLM's 
subsequent sale of the property, constituted unjust enrichment. Id. The credit union had 
done nothing to enhance the value of the property; it simply did not show up to bid. As 
the court correctly held in that case, the benefit of the profit that FHLM realized on the 
eventual resale of the property was conferred "by the purchasing party," not the credit 
union. Id. 
In this case, however, Developers spent innumerable hours, paid hundreds of 
thousands of dollars, and applied their expertise all solely to create a planned community, 
of which the Graffs' land was a part. (R. at 318-19.) Developers increased the value of 
the Graffs" land immensely, and saved the Graffs from having to spend a great deal of 
money and resources to prepare their land for development. Prior to Developers' 
involvement with the Graffs' land, it was not ready for development. After Developers* 
efforts, the land was ready for development. This is a tangible benefit that Graffs should 
not be permitted to keep without paying just compensation to Developers. 
It is for the above reasons that courts apply equitable principles to override rules 
like the statute of frauds when inequity would result. Further, Developers have no other 
remedy at law to recover if the statute of frauds applies to the oral modification of the 
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closing deadline. Therefore, Developers' claim for unjust enrichment survives the trial 
court's order for summary judgment. 
Developers5 detrimental reliance claim also survives. It is based upon the fact that 
Max Graffs modification was a promise upon which Developers reasonably relied to 
their detriment. Despite Graffs' contention that Developers missed their opportunity to 
call for a closing (because they did not do so by June 20, 2006), the record demonstrates 
that Developers consistently informed Max Graff, before June 20, 2006, that they would 
be able to secure financing through hard money lenders to close by June 30, 2006. (R. at 
320-21; 378-79.) It is important to note that the parties were in constant communication, 
were seemingly cooperating and working towards the same goal—the approval of the 
property for development and its sale to Graffs. (R. at 375-379.) Developers specifically 
did not call for a closing by June 30, 2006 because of the communication with Max Graff 
regarding financing options. Without Max Graffs modification of the closing date, 
Developers would have closed by that date. (R. at 321; 378.) 
Developers' reliance is exactly the type of reliance that the promissory estoppel/ 
detrimental reliance cause of action is meant to rectify, and they have no other remedy at 
law through which to find relief. Therefore, for these reasons, as well as those in 
Developers' original brief this Court should reverse the trial court's grant of summary 
judgment because the statute of frauds does not preclude Developers* equitable claims. 
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IV. DEVELOPERS HAVE A GOOD FAITH BASIS IN BOTH LAW AND 
FACT FOR THEIR APPEAL AND COMPLIED WITH ALL OF THE 
RELEVANT RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE. 
This appeal is based upon Developers' good faith belief that genuine issues of 
material fact exist that the partial performance exception to the statute of Fraud applies 
in this case, and that that statute of frauds does not bar recovery under Developers' 
equitable causes of action. Also. Developers' original brief substantially complied with 
relevant procedural and format-based requirements. Therefore, any request that 
Developers' arguments be stricken or for sanctions is not justified.1 
A. Developers supported all of their arguments with facts from the trial record 
and with relevant case law. 
Differences in interpretation of case law, statutes, and factual implications of 
evidence within a case do not constitute frivolity or unreasonableness. Justifiably, both 
Developers and Graffs advance different interpretations of the implications of the pleaded 
facts and the relevant law in this case. Neither party should begrudge the other for doing 
so. Developers welcome and expect vigorous debate regarding the scope of the statute of 
frauds, the partial performance exception, and the survival of Developers* equitable 
claims. Both parties have advanced good faith, law-based arguments that are by no means 
unreasonable or frivolous. 
Graffs also requested punitive damages in their summary of the argument (Graffs" Br. at 
12). but did not do so in the body of their argument. Developers assume that this was 
simply a typo, as punitive damages are generally awarded by juries in tort cases upon 
finding that the defendant's conduct was willful malicious, intentionally fraudulent, or a 
reckless disregard of the rights of others, and not by appellate courts for briefs that do not 
comport with the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. U.C.A. §78B-8-201(l)(a). 
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Developers have based all of their arguments on justifiable interpretations of 
existing Utah law. Developers have not cited cases or principles that have been overruled. 
Furthermore, Developers' Statement of Facts is comprised of facts and justifiable 
inferences based upon those facts that are reflected in the appellate record, vshich is 
exactly what appellate review of a trial court's summary judgment order requires. See 
Bowen v Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434. 436 (Utah 1982) (stating that "the court must 
evaluate all the evidence and all reasonable inferences fairly drawn from the evidence in 
a light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment"1). 
The thrust of this appeal centers on a few basic issues. The first issue is whether or 
not genuine issues of material fact exist. This is a quintessential question for an appellate 
court, and Developers have made the best case that they can as to why genuine issues of 
material fact still exist. The second issue is whether or not the partial performance 
doctrine was satisfied in this case. Developers believe that it was, and Graffs argue that 
the trial court was correct in ruling that it did not. There is no authoritative case law that 
states, without question, that the facts of this case require that one or the other conclusion 
be reached. The third issue, whether or not the equitable claims survived the trial court's 
ruling as to the REPC, is similar to the second, in that no overarching case law or statute 
exists that requires a singular outcome. These issues are genuine, and Developers 
legitimately presented them to this Court. 
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B. Developers' original brief complied with the requirements of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Graffs criticize the organization of Developers' original brief as "illogical/9 
(Graffs' Br. At 33.) Graffs also accuse Developers of failing to cite to the Record as 
paginated. (Id.) Finally, Graffs complain about the lack a transcript of the summary 
judgment hearing. However, these accusations and complaints actually amount to nothing 
more than one inadvertent typo in the body of the argument section. 
As to the briefs organization, Developers first set forth the standard of review for 
this appeal under its "Statement of the Issues" section on the second page of its brief. 
Developers cited Poteet v. White, 2006 UT 63, 147 P.3d 439, as the basis for its statement 
of the standard of review. Developers then decided that a more complete examination of 
the summary judgment standard was appropriate, and placed that examination at the very 
beginning of the argument section of the brief. Developers fail to see how doing this was 
illogical or illegitimate. Also, Developers concede that the argument section of the brief 
contained two headings numbered "11/' rather than separate sections numbered "II" and 
"III/* Developers regret the error. 
~ Throughout their brief, Graffs have failed to follow Utah Supreme Court Standing 
Order No. 4. which requires that "any brief... filed in the Utah Supreme Court or the 
Utah Court of Appeals'" include in the citation of any published opinion of the Utah 
Supreme Court or the Utah Court of Appeals issued on or after January 1, 1999 "the case 
name, the year the opinion was issued, identification of the court that issued the opinion 
... and the sequential number assigned to the opinion by the respective court/* 
Developers only emphasize this to highlight that numerous requirements for appellate 
briefs exist and that both parties may overlook some. Further, Developers suggest that 
both parties to any appeal should focus their efforts on responding to the substance of the 
other party's arguments rather than identifying minor technical deficiencies that do not 
affect the substance of the argument. 
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As to Graffs5 accusation that Developers failed to cite to the record as paginated, 
Developers believe that they followed the exact requirements of rule 24(e).3 Developers 
are unaware of any errors, and certainly do not believe that they included "in excess of 
100 erroneous citations to the Record," as Graffs charged. (Graffs' Br. at 33.) 
Although Developers do not know the specific reasons behind Graffs' 
protestations, it is likely that the two parties are simply looking to two different sources 
of the same information within the record. For example, Developers cite numerous times 
to evidence originally found in an affidavit submitted by Dave Robinson. However, 
rather than citing to the original affidavit, Developers cite to memoranda and other 
pleadings that incorporated the affidavit into both the fact and arguments sections.4 
Developers are unaware of any rule that requires a citation to an affidavit over a filed 
pleading when both documents proffer the same evidence. If such a rule exists, either in 
law or simply in common practice, Developers regret the confusion. However, citation to 
a portion of the record that states what the brief purports it to state does not violate rule 
24(e), and therefore Developers believe that they are in full compliance with the 
requirements of the rule. 
J
 This portion of the rule states: "[References in briefs to the record. References shall be 
made to the pages of the original record as paginated pursuant to 11(b)." Utah R. App. P. 
24(e). 
4
 For example, Developers frequently cited to the pages of the record containing a 
memorandum in response to a motion for partial summary judgment, found at pages R. 
313-337. Most of the assertions within that memorandum were based upon the Affidavit 
of David Robinson, found at pages R. 374-382. An analysis of Graffs' brief demonstrates 
that they cited to the pages of the affidavit, rather than to the corresponding pages of the 
memorandum. This also occurred in connection with another memorandum that wras 
based upon a separate affidavit submitted by Dave Robinson. The memorandum is found 
at pages R. 1002-1012, and the affidavit is found at pages R. 1015-1023. 
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Finally, Developers did not include the transcript of the hearing on the motion for 
summary judgment because the trial court specifically ordered that Developers were not 
required to include the transcript. (See Ruling re: Motion to Compel attached as 
Addendum A).5 Developers' contention that the summary judgment order should not 
have included the equitable claims rests upon several valid contentions, only one of 
which is that these claims were not argued during the hearing. Also, both parties 
submitted arguments after the hearing regarding inclusion of the equitable claims in the 
trial court's order granting summary judgment. (See R. 1101-1127, 1129-1140.) Neither 
of these arguments referred to anything stated or argued during the hearing. Finally, 
Graffs have not identified, in their original motion to compel inclusion of the transcript or 
in their brief to this Court, any substantive reason that the transcript should be included in 
the record to be cited by either party in the appeal, except simply to confirm what both 
parties already know and the relevant pleadings more than sufficiently demonstrate—that 
the hearing did not include arguments regarding the equitable claims. 
C. Developers did not mischaracterize the record. 
Most of Graffs* examples of purported mischaracterization of the record are 
simply differences in interpretation of the implications of the evidence within the record. 
As stated above, disagreements between parties regarding the implications of material 
facts generally constitute the heart of any litigation, and the same is true in this case. 
5
 This order is not included in the Judgment Roll and Index, because the issue was 
decided after the Notice of Appeal was filed. Developers attach it now only for the 
tangential purpose of responding to Graffs' accusations, and not as substantive evidence 
of any actual issue to be considered in this appeal. 
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Developers will rest upon this explanation for most of the alleged "mischaracterizations" 
that Appellee highlights. However, brief specific treatment of three of Graffs' accusations 
is in order. 
First Appellee asserts that ''page 1007 does not contain anything like" the 
statement that "Max wanted Naterra to go out of contract because Max felt that Graffs 
could sell the property for more money due to the improvements that Developers made 
on the property*" (Appellees' Br. at 37 (quoting Appellants5, Br. at 17) (emphasis in 
Appellees' brief).) However, paragraph 20 of page 1007 of the record (which cites a 
portion of an affidavit which can be found on page 1022 of the record), states the 
following: "[ajfter the parties went out of contract Max Graff informed Dave Robinson 
that [Max] had been praying that the sale would go into default so he could get more 
money." That Graff wanted Developers to go out of contract so that he could sell the 
property for more money (which would be a direct result of the improvements made on 
the property by Developers) is a reasonable inference to draw from page 1007 of the 
record, and Developers simply expressed that reasonable inference in their argument. 
Second. Appellee states that Ck[t]here is no evidence in the Record to support any 
assertion that Developers indicated to Graffs that they had any ability to close on June 30. 
2006 using 'hard money' lenders or any other alternative." (Appellees' Br. at 38. 
(emphasis in Appellees" brief).) However, paragraph 18 on page 321 of the record (citing 
R. at 378, *f 18) states the following: u [°] n more than one occasion, prior to the June 30, 
2006 closing deadline. Robinson informed Max Graff that if Naterra could not obtain 
financing from the preferred bank loan by the closing deadline, Naterra would be able to 
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close on the purchase of the property through these various investors or '.hard money 
lenders." Developers cited this exact paragraph on page 9 of its brief to support its 
contention that Developers were prepared to close on June 30 if Max Graff did not want 
to offer farther extensions. In fact, pages 320-22 of the record are replete with references 
to Developers' ability to close by the deadline through hard money lending, but its 
preference for traditional bank financing. 
Third, Developers utilized the position that Graffs did not dispute the existence of 
an oral agreement and reliance upon that agreement for the exact same purpose that it 
was utilized in the trial court setting—to determine whether or not, as a matter of law, 
Graffs would be entitled to judgment under the statute of frauds. (See Appellants" Br. at 
18-22). Graffs conceded, solely for the purpose of the summary judgment motion, that 
both were undisputed. (Appellees' Br. at 39.) Developers were simply arguing from that 
same analytical standpoint. Developers' brief was not internally inconsistent; rather, i1 
simply advanced arguments in the appropriate context, for a party moving for summary 
judgment must establish both that no genuine issues of material fact exist and that it is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). 
In sum, Developers have a good faith basis, both in law and based upon the facts 
of this case, for this appeal. Furthermore, Developers followed the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. For these reasons, Graffs' requests—that this Court strike 
Developers' arguments, dismiss its brief, and order Developers to pay attorney's fees and 
punitive damages—are wholly unjustified. 
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CONCLUSION 
Developers properly preserved all of the issues presented m this appeal at the trial 
court level. Also, the partial performance exception to the statute of frauds applies in this 
case. Furthermore, Developers' equitable claims survive imposition of the Statute of 
frauds. Finally, Developers' appeal has a good faith basis in both law and fact, and 
Developers complied with the requirements of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Therefore, this Court should reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment and 
remand the matter back to the trial court. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 21st day of November 2008. 
HILL, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ, L.C. 
Stephen Qusrenberry 
Charles L. Perschon 
Aaron R. Harris 
Attorneys for Defendants/Counterclaim 
Plaintiffs/Intervening 
Plaintiffs/Developers Fusion Group, 
LLC, Naterra West, LLC, and Gateway 
Farms, LLC 
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